2018-05-09 · The Frege-Geach problem is an issue in ethics. Specifically, metaethics, which deals with all of the finickity bits - such as what terms like good, and right, can actually mean. It is named after Peter Geach, a 20th century philosopher, and Gottlob Frege (pronounced Fray-guh), born in 1848. It can also be referred to as…

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The Frege–Geach problem derives from the fact that it is not straightforward to say what the meanings of complex moral sentences are, given the noncognitivist’s commitments about the meanings of simple moral sentences (see Compositionality). The Frege-Geach Problem 60 Years Later: A Tribute to an Enduring Semantic Puzzle Joseph h. Beauchamp I n his 1965 article titled “Assertion”, Peter Geach attributes to Frege the view that a proposition contains the same content, whether it is asserted or not. By proposition, Geach specifies that he is referring to The Frege-Geach problem threatens to be disastrous for the non-cognitivist. Our ability to engage in moral reasoning and debate depends on our ability to make sense of complex moral sentences and the inferences we can draw from our moral judgments. The non-cognitivist must provide a plausible ac- Frege–Geach contends that "It is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies" can be deduced from the two premises by modus ponens as follows: It is wrong to tell lies.

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Unwin, Nicholas (1999) ‘Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege–Geach Problem’, Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196): 337–352. (This is a particularly important piece about Blackburn that helps to shed light on what makes the Frege–Geach problem difficult.) 2004-01-23 · As Geach saw it, we need to think of predication as constant across embedded and unembedded occurrences of predicative moral sentences so as not to commit a fallacy of equivocation in making arguments. (It is due to Geach’s invocation of Frege in this context that the embedding problem is often called the Frege-Geach problem. 2. The Frege-Geach problem. The Frege-Geach problem was first raised by Ross (1939: 33–34) and independently by Geach (1958, 1960, 1965) and Searle (1962, 1969) and was originally directed at expressivist proposals such as Ayer's emotivism: It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to express feeling. Today they will be looking into the Frege-Geach Problem.The Frege-Geach proble Join George and John as they discuss and debate different Philosophical ideas.

Frege-Geach Problem är en invändning mot non-kognitivism, tanken vi med värdeutsagor inte uttrycker påståenden som kan klassas som sanna eller falska.

How Non-Cognitivists Should Avoid the Frege- Geach Problem. Ridge, M. ( Speaker). School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences.

7 Allan Gibbard, Wise  Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege- Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their  This chapter discusses how Ecumenical Expressivism can solve the dreaded Frege–Geach problem better than any of its Non-Ecumenical rivals. It first explains  In. Chapter Four I argue that there is, in fact, no such thing as the Frege-Geach problem and distinguish four distinct arguments that have been discussed under   Frege-Geach problem and metaethical expressivism. Cekić Nenad (Filozofski fakultet, Beograd).

I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the 

Gibbard’s solution is technically more complicated than Blackburn’s, and builds on the idea of possible-worlds semantics that ordinary nonmoral beliefs can be modelled by sets of worlds (see Gibbard 1990; Semantics, possible worlds).

The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the attention both of defenders of broadly noncognitivist views, and of their critics. Se hela listan på iep.utm.edu Frege-Geach problem is to give an account of meaning for normative and simi-lar sentences which satisfies the constraint that expressive use is fundamental to understanding the meaning of normative sentences in any context. Not all “meanings” are necessarily expressible Abstracting a little from the specifics of our argument, what seems to be driving the problem for Ridge is this: to get the right kind of guarantee needed for a successful solution to the Frege-Geach problem you need a much tighter connection between the belief and desire-like elements posited than Ridge's account allows. 14 To put this into the context of the history of moral psychology, we Se hela listan på iep.utm.edu 2.
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See more of The Frege-Geach Problem on Facebook Having first introduced this kind of higher-order state view (section 1), I argue that it can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege-Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5). ISSN oo3i-8o94.

The Frege-Geach problem. The Frege-Geach problem was first raised by Ross (1939: 33–34) and independently by Geach (1958, 1960, 1965) and Searle (1962, 1969) and was originally directed at expressivist proposals such as Ayer's emotivism: It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to express feeling. Today they will be looking into the Frege-Geach Problem.The Frege-Geach proble Join George and John as they discuss and debate different Philosophical ideas.
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PAUS Efter pausen: Blackburns lösning på Frege Geach Problemet INSTITUTIONEN FÖR FILOSOFI, LINGVISTIK OCH VETENSKAPSTEORI Blackburns 

We were dealing there with the Frege-Geach Problem (i.e. problem with explaining what moral sentences mean in contexts in which we do not seem to be expressing our attitudes, i.e. in embedded or unasserted contexts). Abstract. I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivismen, Frege-Geach-problemet och Expressive-Assertivismen kretsar alla tre främst kring språkfilosofiska problem och hur det moraliska språket fungerar (därav är det nästan givet, om inte helt och hållet, att mitt val av frågeställning för uppsatsen kommer Frege-Geach problem (Unwin 1999, 2001, Dreier 2006a, 2006b, Schroeder 2008). We will call this particular package of difficulties the negation problem.